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Abstract
The initial screening decision that marketing managers make is critical. It requires
the selection of what innovation project to invest in, which is fundamental to mar-
keting success. However, our knowledge of how managers make these decisions and
how this impacts performance is limited. By drawing upon cognitive psychology and
the managerial decision‐making literature, we address two critical questions. The
first question focuses on identifying specific decision‐making types (e.g., specific
heuristics, intuition) used when making an innovation screening decision. Based on
this analysis and prior research, we develop specific decision‐maker profiles about
how an individual manager decides. The second research question is about con-
necting these profiles with performance. Specifically, it addresses what the con-
sequences of different decision‐maker profiles are on the perceived accuracy and
speed of decision‐making? Data were collected from 122 senior managers in these
industries. We find that when heuristics are used alone, or concurrently with in-
tuition, managers make decisions that are as accurate as when they rely on analy-
tical decision‐making. However, the process is significantly faster. The findings
provide an important step toward a more comprehensive understanding of decision‐
making at the front‐end of innovation.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
While traveling on a delayed train from Manchester to London, an
idea for a fantasy novel came to J. K. Rowling. After about 6 years
working on it, the debut book of the Harry Potter series—Harry Potter
and the Philosopher's Stone, was ready. It took 12 rejections in a row
before Bloomsbury Publishing accepted to publish an initial print run
of just 500 copies. The reaction of readers far exceeded expectations,
and the book became one of the greatest publishing successes in
history, selling over 100million copies worldwide (Time, 2013). The
phenomenal success of Harry Potter has greatly benefited the
publishers, Bloomsbury, and has been one of the main drivers of their
growth in the past decade. Almost certainly, it caused a lifetime of
regret for those publishers who declined Rowling's book. How did
managers, with considerable expertise in their field, look at the same
manuscript and decide not to invest in one of the best‐selling books
of all time?
The case of J. K. Rowling, and her book Harry Potter and the
Philosopher's Stone, is not unique. In the marketing context, many
managers flounder when it comes to deciding what innovation pro-
jects to select for development. Such decisions are one of the most
challenging marketers encounter since they are made under
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conditions of high uncertainty using relatively vague and often neb-
ulous criteria. Managers simply lack sufficient knowledge that would
enable them to predict customer reactions accurately, market
potential, feasibility, and risks (Hammedi, van Riel, & Sasovova, 2011;
Loch, Solt, & Bailey, 2008). Some scholars refer to this early stage in
the product development process as the “fuzzy front‐end of in-
novation” (Hauser, Tellis, & Griffin, 2006; Smith & Reinertsen, 1992).
Deciding what innovation project to pursue is strategically important
and has direct consequences for organizational competitiveness and
success (Chao & Kavadias, 2008). Moreover, the innovation screen-
ing decision will result in substantial investment commitment and
opportunity costs. It is a crucial element highlighted by Hauser et al.
(2006, p. 702) in their seminal review on research on innovation who
note that “early decisions in product development processes have the
highest leverage.”
This study focuses on innovation screening decisions and has two
main objectives. First, it explores how managers make choices when
deciding among different innovation projects by addressing both
analytical and nonanalytical processes of decision‐making. The key
contribution we make here is that while there is substantial con-
ceptual work on how managers make choices and research based
upon specific examples of decision, there has yet to be a compre-
hensive review utilizing existing typologies. In so doing, it takes an
important step to recognize and identify the full range of processes in
innovation screening decisions. It explores the extent of reliance on
specific decision‐making types, that can be analytic and nonanalytic.
Analytic decisions are systematic and made by managers and leaders
based upon reliable data, together with other information and have
often been seen as the superior mode that managers should pursue
(Baron, 1998; Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989). One example would be
Coca Cola's focused use of big data analysis on social media aimed at
aligning the brand with consumer interests (Marr, 2017). On the
other hand, a nonanalytic decision is one based upon unaided human
judgment (Meehl, 1954). An example would be the decision by Stefan
Pierer, CEO of KTM Motorcycles, who ultimately refocused the
company away from off‐road motorcycling to the street bike market
without any evidence, merely claiming: “I wake up in the night and
have a feeling that I should do it differently” (Matzler, Bailom, &
Mooradian, 2007). This focus is essential because knowledge of how
marketers make decisions is limited (Van Bruggen & Wierenga, 2000;
Wierenga & Van Bruggen, 1997).
Second, we explore the consequences of different decision‐
maker profiles in terms of perceived decision‐making accuracy and
speed. A decision‐maker profile focuses on how a manager makes a
decision. More specifically, the profiles arise from the extent to which
a manager relies on different decision‐making types, which are de-
veloped based on theory (and are refined based on data). In doing so,
it addresses the call by Wierenga (2011) to examine interactions
between different decision‐making types and provides insights on
how heuristics and their interaction with analytical and instinctive
processes affect decision‐making performance. The research seeks to
provide a comprehensive framework depicting different decision‐
maker profiles in selecting innovation projects and their
consequences. Such an understanding has practical relevance as
clearly noted by Wierenga (2011, p. 89), who observes that “the
quality of managerial decision making is the single most determining
factor for the success of marketing management.” It would be useful
from the outset to consider definitions and provide further examples.
We begin with an assessment of the theoretical background to
decision making with a focus on its application to marketing practice
with a specific focus on decision‐making in new product development
(NPD), intuition, heuristics, and performance. It then provides an
explanation and justification for the method applied and an assess-
ment of the results. Thereafter, we place the results into context with
the discussion, and the theoretical and managerial implications are
reviewed.
2 | THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
2.1 | Decision‐making in NPD
Decisions in the fuzzy front‐end of innovation are one of the most
challenging and essential that managers make. It is challenging be-
cause such decisions are often made under substantial uncertainty in
terms of, for example, consumer preferences or risks (e.g., Hammedi
et al., 2011). Such decisions are important because of their impact on
the success of the organization (Chao & Kavadias, 2008). Given the
importance and difficulty of screening decisions that require the
selection of innovation projects to pursue, it is not surprising that
researchers and practitioners exhibit a keen interest in tools that can
enhance the effectiveness of such decisions.
Prior research has focused on various criteria that managers con-
sider in evaluating alternative new product ideas (e.g., Behrens, 2016;
Blau, Pekny, Varma, & Bunch, 2004; Carbonell‐Foulquié, Munuera‐
Alemán, & Rodríguez‐Escudero, 2004; Cooper, Edgett, & Kleinsch-
midt, 2001; de Oliveira, Rozenfeld, Phaal, & Probert, 2015). Therefore,
by way of example, Behrens (2016) reports that financial ratios, demand
uncertainty, competitive advantage, and risk, are essential criteria for
managers when deciding what projects to focus on. A survey of
77 managers found that managers use more criteria in the fuzzy front‐
end of innovation (Carbonell‐Foulquié, Munuera‐Alemán, & Rodríguez‐
Escudero, 2004). An examination of how specific criteria relate to
outcomes of innovation projects shows that the use of market and
technical criteria are positively related to the competitiveness of firms.
In contrast, strategic criteria were not (Martinsuo & Poskela, 2011).
Besides, scholars have also focused on the extent to which using formal
procedures for choosing among new product ideas affect outcomes.
These research findings provide conflicting results with some reporting
that formality of evaluation is related to positive outcomes (e.g., Eling,
Griffin, & Langerak, 2016; Kock, Heising, & Gemünden, 2015).
Overall, research on nonanalytical processes in screening deci-
sions, and marketing decision‐making in general, has been limited. An
important conclusion is that managers do not just use analytical
methods in decision‐making. They also rely significantly on their in-
tuition and the application of readily available heuristics (Dane &
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Pratt, 2007: Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Kolbe, Bossink, & De
Man, 2019; Wierenga, 2011).
2.2 | Intuition
Intuition plays a central role in managerial decision‐making, including
decisions related to NPD. For example, the launch of the sports car
Dodge Viper and the prime time launch of “Who Wants to Be a
Millionaire” were reportedly based upon managers' intuition
(Hayashi, 2001). Despite such examples, marketing and management
scholars have yet to agree on what intuition is; what it does; and even
when it can be used effectively. We do not attempt to settle the con-
troversy here; instead, we seek to understand better the evaluation
process typically used when choosing between alternative NPD pro-
jects. We recognize that in common usage, and often in the media (e.g.,
NPR, 2006), intuition is often associated with having a “hunch,” a “gut
feeling,” or having “insight.”
Much research in the area has treated intuition as a process
(a way of sorting data) or an outcome (something that you recognize)
or both (Dane & Pratt, 2007). This study follows the latter approach.
The suggestion here is that intuition is a fast nonconscious thought
process that leads to an outcome that, in our case, is based upon the
marketing environment. Intuiting necessitates a fast process of
retrieval (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996) and recognition of often
several thousand chunks of information stored in long‐term memory
(Agor, 1989; Shirley & Langan‐Fox, 1996) rather than a guess. Inter-
estingly, when someone intuits, there are no requirements for
awareness of rules of knowledge to be used (Shapiro & Spence, 1997),
and the final defining nature of intuition is that it involves affect‐based
judgments often accompanied by excitement and harmony
(Hayashi, 2001). We now turn to heuristics.
2.3 | Heuristics
Much of management decision‐making may be positioned in the
realm of bounded rationality (Simon, 1955), logic, probability, and
heuristics (Barnes, 1984). Bounded rationality argues that assump-
tions of full rationality and complete knowledge in decision‐making
are unrealistic (van Bruggen & Wierenga, 2000). Although people
attempt to make rational decisions, the decision‐making process
adopted often necessitates a compromise. An example would be the
situation of a firm setting an advertising budget that attempts to
balance a variety of objectives (Kolsarici, Vakratsas, & Naik, 2020;
West, Ford, & Farris, 2014) or deciding upon where to site a manu-
facturing plant in Asia (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011). However, while
the latter authors take a process approach to explain the use of such
applied heuristics, we instead employ conceptually underpinned
heuristic types. Notwithstanding, their findings that managers tend
to use a small portfolio of rules, fits well with our perspective. In the
case of logic, the focus is on mental models and cognition to solve
well‐structured problems. At the same time, probability works
alongside logic to reach an inductive rather than a deductive con-
clusion. Taken together, logic and probability underpin the process of
decision‐making based upon a detailed examination of available data.
Also, the inductive process recognizes that samples of information
are prone to error and necessitate risky “bets” on the future state of
the market.
Heuristics consist of methodologies that seek to solve problems
within the boundary of rationality using loosely applicable informa-
tion based upon selective judgment (Zuckerman & Chaiken, 1998).
Heuristics consist of ordered cues that offer a means to minimize
noise and, thereby, often outperform the cognitive advantages of
logic and probability (Åstebro & Elhedhli, 2006). By using heuristics,
decision‐makers can “forget” data and focus on pertinent issues. As a
result, heuristics simplify decision‐making because they provide
“good enough” solutions to problems (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011;
Wollschlaeger & Diederich, 2020).
Although a range of heuristics has been reported from specific
tests and experiments in the literature, these can be grouped into nine
broad types. First, the most basic is “default” that represents the
choice made that is most similar to what would typically be done
(Johnson & Raab, 2003). For example, the management of a company
that manufactures faucets for use in kitchens is most likely to choose
new product ideas that fit with the materials and styles that it reg-
ularly uses. Second is “recognition” where a choice is made based upon
a previous encounter or knowledge (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002).
Using the same example, management at the faucet manufacturer
might pick a new product based upon previous experience as to what
is popular amongst its retail distributors. "Recognition" is closely linked
to the third heuristic of “fluency,” which involves making a choice
based upon the outcome that can be most quickly recognized
(Schooler & Hertwig, 2005). Continuing with the faucet company
example, management would choose a new project based upon a style
and materials already used to save time. The fourth heuristic of
“take‐the‐best” may also be grouped with the “recognition” group of
heuristics with a choice made based on what is thought to be best
(Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). Here our faucet company manage-
ment would make a choice of faucet style and materials that they
believe would make the best use of their resources in terms of likely
market return. The fifth heuristic is that of “satisficing” that requires
more cognitively demanding processes. A decision is made by adopting
the first choice that exceeds objectives and ignores the rest, thereby
saving time and effort (Simon, 1955; Todd & Miller, 1999). In this case,
the management would prioritize time and effort and choose the style
and materials of a new faucet that can meet their objectives while
ignoring other viable alternatives. The sixth heuristic of “tallying” takes
“satisficing” further (Dawes, 1979) and involves scoring each option
with the final choice being the one with the highest score. Faced with a
choice of several styles and material combinations, the management of
the faucet company would assess the positive and negative features
scores of each design separately, opting for the design with the highest
score. The seventh heuristic of “experience” is based on social inter-
actions, with the choice ultimately made by whomever the team
agrees possesses the most experience (Boyd & Richerson, 2004). With
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this heuristic in mind, the management, faced with several new faucet
choices, would defer to the manager with the most experience and
best track record. The eighth heuristic is termed “majority” and is also
centered on social interaction, but here the choice is based upon what
the majority wants (Boyd & Richerson, 2004). Here the management
team would discuss the faucet options and hold a majority vote to
decide. Finally, the “equality” heuristic covers the situation where no
single choice is made, and resources are instead allocated “equally”
across all competing options (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). This
option has considerable resource implications and typically cannot be
applied across multiple alternatives. Using the faucet example where
management needs to decide among several potential new faucet
designs, the decision is made to allocate resources across all options.
No choice is effectively made, and each design option is allocated an
equal share of the budget.
These heuristic types discussed above collectively form a central
component of this study. They are critical elements in the decision‐
maker profiles that will be discussed in the results section.
2.4 | Decision‐making performance
The theoretical discussion on heuristics has often revolved around
accuracy and speed trade‐offs (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011).
The premise is that during decision‐making, some information is
ignored, so that a decision‐maker can save time and effort and
come up with quicker decisions at the expense of accuracy. As a
consequence, heuristics are often reported as leading to both
suboptimal decisions (Barnes, 1984; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979;
Mezias & Starbuck, 2003) as well as quick and accurate decisions
(Bauer, Schmitt, Morwitz, & Winer, 2013; Goldstein & Gigerenzer,
2009; Holte, 1993; Prabhaker & Sauer, 1994; Wübben &
Wangenheim, 2008). However, an emergent theme gaining sal-
iency in the literature and offering a competing premise, is what is
known as “fast and frugal heuristics.” By applying knowledge and
computation in a minimal amount of time, more noise is filtered
out, and quicker and better adaptive choices are made in any given
environment. In short, heuristics can produce decision outcomes
that are often equal or even better than those made by analytics
(Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Oppenheimer, 2003). Indeed,
several simulations have shown that simple heuristics often out-
perform more complex integrative investigations (Czerlinski,
Gigerenzer, & Goldstein, 1999; Makridakis & Hibon, 2000).
What do managers actually do? There is a large body of empirical
work in cognitive psychology focused on distinguishing the decision‐
making performance of experts and nonexperts. Comparing man-
agers to students has been the most common approach, with several
studies suggesting that managers outperform such “proxy” novices.
Managers have been found to make decisions more quickly (Day &
Lord, 1992; Fredrickson, 1985; Isenberg, 1986); to be unaffected
by context (Fredrickson, 1985) and to require less information
(Isenberg, 1986). Managers have also reported outperforming
statistical forecasting models in predicting the likelihood that an
invention reaches the market (Åstebro & Elhedhli, 2006). They have
also been found to keep their heuristics portfolio small and prune
the number of heuristics used as they gain experience (Bingham &
Eisenhardt, 2011). Besides, managers have also been found to be only
slightly below par to commercial databases in identifying potential
high‐value lifetime customers (Wübben & Wangenheim, 2008).
Nevertheless, managers have not always been found to have uni-
versal superiority over novices (Armstrong, 1991; Hoch, 1988).
Moreover, the literature does not provide a clear picture of how
heuristics affect decision‐making performance.
One explanation for these conflicting findings may be that the
decision‐making benefits that heuristics can achieve are context‐
dependent (Chang & Wu, 2012). This is supported by the concept of
ecological rationality, which suggests that the effectiveness of
heuristics, and other decision‐making types, is dependent on the
environment (Bauer et al., 2013; Deshpande & Zaltman, 1984;
Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). Notwithstanding the competing
findings, the literature does underline the role of heuristics in the
effective screening of innovation decisions. We, therefore, set out to
address two crucial questions:
• RQ1: What specific decision‐making types do managers use when
making an innovation screening decision?
• RQ2: What is the relationship between different decision‐maker pro-
files, and perceived accuracy and speed of decisions made?
3 | METHODOLOGY
3.1 | Measures
Given the absence of prior empirical research on the types of heur-
istic employed by managers in the innovation selection processes, an
exploratory approach to survey development was adopted. It was
developed from 10 interviews with UK senior managers in the
creative industries whose jobs involved choosing between creative
projects. Four managers were in advertising (clients and agencies),
three in publishing and data management, two in high‐tech manu-
facturing, and one in the marketing of financial services. Each face‐to‐
face interview was semi‐structured with a protocol and conducted by
one of the researchers and lasted between 16 and 45min (median
32min). After each meeting, the researchers considered the notes
and agreed on common themes. This process was undertaken with
the literature in mind but without any a priori theoretical perspec-
tives. Themes were identified through an iterative process of re-
finement and reformulation (Arnould & Wallendorf, 1994)
immediately after each interview. The interview process sought to
ensure consistency and comparability of the questionnaire, and each
commenced by asking informants about their knowledge and ex-
periences of project development. Each interview followed a funnel
approach starting with a short general discussion of project selection
that quickly moved to a more specific discussion on the embryo
questionnaire (Belk, Fischer, & Kozinets, 2012). Given the focus on
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the questionnaire development, the role of these initial interviews
was advisory. We recognize that by including four industries, and in
the case of the advertising industry including both clients and
agencies, our survey instrument gained in terms of breadth at the
expense of depth. No transcripts were recorded or coded since the
intent was to fine‐tune the final instrument. Typical statements by
participants were: “try to make the introductory text shorter” and
“with Q1, I guess I need to pick whether it is external or internal. The
remaining options could be shown as a multiple‐choice." Another
noted, “I immediately set off on the wrong track assuming from Q1
that the survey was about creative ways to make a decision (i.e.,
creative decision‐making processes).” These comments were used to
refine the questionnaire and generate clusters. The researchers fol-
lowed this process up as the interviews progressed. A systematic,
iterative procedure of moving back‐and‐forward between the initial
clusters and the relevant literature to strengthen the clusters was
pursued (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). This process sought to identify
common connections and patterns between the identified themes to
create the final clusters. As the interviews progressed, the re-
searchers sought to ensure that each emerging cluster appeared
reasonable based on the themes as these developed across the in-
terviews (Glaser & Strauss, 2017). The qualitative interviews lead to
the identification of two different heuristics termed “hierarchy” and
“defer.” “Hierarchy” bears some similarity to the “experience” heur-
istic and involves choosing the option that senior managers wanted
while “defer” involves hiring an external consultant to make the
decision.
We included a question for each of the 13 decision‐making types
namely: “instinct,” “analysis,” “default,” “recognition,” “fluency,” “take‐
the‐best,” “satisficing,” “tallying,” “experience,” “majority,” “equality,”
“hierarchy,” and “defer.” In answering the 13 questions, respondents
were asked to think about the most recent innovation project for
which they needed to make a screening decision. Following a clear
explanation of each decision‐making type, they were asked to state
the extent to which they used the approach described in each item in
their decision‐making. Each response was captured using a 7‐point
Strongly disagree/Strongly agree Likert‐type scale.
We also measured two distinct aspects of decision‐making
performance: perceived confidence in decision‐making accuracy and
decision‐making speed. Perceived decision‐making accuracy was
assessed by asking managers to report the extent to which they
believed they made the right decision on a 100‐point scale. This
item was adapted from the decision‐making effectiveness scale by
Hammedi et al. (2011). We argue for the use of managers' sub-
jective self‐report judgments, noting that objective measures of
accuracy are inappropriate as the performance of innovation pro-
jects is influenced by many factors that cannot be foreseen at the
initial innovation decision‐making stage. The item to measure per-
ceived decision‐making speed was taken from Baum and Wally
(2003) and was kept as a reverse‐scored item. This item asked
participants to indicate the extent of time spent on the project on a
7‐point scale. The reason for using different scale points and a re-
versed score for the dependent variables was to diminish the risk of
potential common‐method bias (Podsakoff, Mackenzie, Lee, &
Podsakoff, 2003).
In addition, demographic information about respondents and their
organization and market were collected. Individual demographics
consisted of gender, age, and job title while market environment and
business information collected consisted of the type of business, size
of the company, and how long the company had existed. Since the role
of the experience of managers in heuristics decision‐making is often
highlighted in the literature (e.g., Fredrickson, 1985), respondents
were also asked for their reaction to the question: “I have considerable
creative decision‐making experience.” The item was followed by a
7‐point strongly disagree/strongly agree Likert‐type scale.
Common‐method bias in the data collected may have occurred
because of two reasons. First, no external data for the dependent
variables of decision‐making accuracy and speed were available, and
second, single informants were used for measuring both the
dependent and independent variables (e.g., Harrison, McLaughlin, &
Coalter, 1996). Therefore, several procedural remedies and testing
recommended by Podsakoff et al. (2003) were applied to address the
potential presence of common‐method bias. First, clear definitions
for “instinct,” “analytic,” and “heuristics” were provided in the ques-
tionnaire to minimize potential item ambiguity. Second, to further
ensure that the questionnaire was clear and understandable, the
items used were amended to reflect the findings from the qualitative
interviews with managers. Third, to minimize the risk of evaluation
apprehension, respondents were allowed to remain anonymous.
Also, while the questions in the first two clusters were all 7‐point
Likert‐type scales, the two questions in the last cluster made use of a
100‐point scale anchor for the perceived decision‐making accuracy
measure and a reversed 7‐point scale for decision‐making speed.
Finally, common‐method bias was subsequently formally tested using
Harman's single factor test (Harman, 1960). The analysis showed the
presence of five factors with an eigenvalue over 1, and the first factor
explained 23.17% of the variance. These findings suggest that
common‐method bias is not likely to be a significant concern.
3.2 | Sample and data collection
The sample consists of managers in the creative industries. There are
several reasons why creative industries represent a promising setting
to study innovation screening decisions. First, creative industries are
regularly faced with investment choice decisions among innovation
projects. Examples include: “what book to publish?” “what film to
produce?” and “what software development project to pursue?”.
Second, innovations are significant for creative industries. Third,
screening decisions in creative industries are highly challenging be-
cause they cannot be based entirely on analyses and are character-
ized by demand uncertainty and infinite variety (Caves, 2000). Their
decision‐making types are nonanalytical and likely to include heur-
istics and instinct. As was the case with the Harry Potter and the
Philosopher's Stone example, a publisher wishing to choose a manu-
script for publication from among a range of submissions by different
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authors is unable to resort to a set of algorithms. Finally, the re-
levance of creative industries comes from the substantial economic
importance of the sector. The UK creative industries are estimated to
be worth the equivalent of US$1.15 trillion per year to the economy
(Government, 2017).
We purchased a list from Dun & Bradstreet (D&B), made pos-
sible by funding provided by the British Academy to reach the
sample. The list used consisted of senior managers in four pre‐
selected UK creative industry sectors, namely: advertising, digital,
publishing, and software. These sectors were partly chosen because
D&B was able to identify specific managers from each of these sec-
tors, and partly because they proved highly representative, ac-
counting for 74% of all employment in the industry (Department for
Digital, Culture, Media & Sport—DCMS, 2018).
We piloted the questionnaire using a convenience sample of
50 managers who were selected randomly from the database. The
purpose of the pilot was to ensure the integrity and readability of the
questionnaire. The selected managers received a cover email that
explained the motivation of the study.1 We collected data via a link to
the questionnaire on Qualtrics. Two days later, follow‐up telephone
calls were made to managers who had not yet replied. Ten managers
had not received the email, possibly because the survey link included
in the cover email led to it being treated as spam. The opportunity
was taken to discuss a variety of tactical aspects of the survey with
nonrespondents who provided their advice despite not having
completed the questionnaire. A total of eight versions of the initial
questionnaire were each piloted with 50 respondents (8 × 50 = 400 in
total), over 3 weeks.
At the end of this process, it became clear to us that the ques-
tionnaire receiving the highest response rate consisted of the version
that was the shortest and, interestingly made use of the respondent's
first name in the covering email. It was decided that it was necessary
to make a trade‐off between the length of the survey to be adopted
(given the busy professional sample used), and obtaining the desired
response rate (given the evidence of an inverse relationship of length
and response). As such, somewhat controversially, the study decided
to make use of single‐item measures to capture several variables of
interest.
The decision was not made lightly, knowing it was flying in the
face of the conventional multi‐item convention. The simple fact
was that from a practical perspective, the key finding from the
eight tests was that the version with single‐item measures worked
best. Evidence suggests that this may be because single items help
eliminate redundancy and avoid negative feelings by reducing the
boredom and frustration that long multi‐item questionnaires can
foster (Robins, Hendin, & Trzesniewski, 2001). Such questions are
also quicker to complete and more flexible than multi‐item scales
(Nagy, 2002). Besides, there was the nature of the sample to
consider. It has been reported that managers have much less
trouble understanding and responding to basic concepts than
“normal consumers” thereby making the use of single‐item mea-
sures particularly suitable (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1977; Piercy, 1987).
Despite some concerns being raised regarding psychometric
properties of short scales (e.g., Harrison et al., 1996), single‐item
scales are robust (Wanous, Reichers, & Hudy, 1997) and help
reliability (Drolet & Morrison, 2001). Besides, when an underlying
construct is unambiguous and unidimensional, it may not suffer
from loss of validity or explanatory power (Bergkvist & Rossiter,
2007; Rossiter, 2002; Sackett & Larson, 1990). As such, the deci-
sion was made to use single‐item measures for the variables.
The final survey of the research instrument was sent by email to
780 participants identified as key in the four creative industries
targeted. Recipients were requested to pass on the questionnaire for
completion to the most senior marketing person in the company if
this did not happen to be them. Out of the emails sent, 172 “bounced
back;” 26 were incomplete, resulting in 122 usable questionnaires or
an effective response rate of 21.0%.
Respondents were 80% male with a mean age of 49.3 (SD 8.76).
Just over 65% were Directors (Account/Development/Digital/Com-
mercial/Creative/Marketing/Sales) and 16% were CEOs. This gender
gap in our sample is reflective of managerial positions in general (e.g.,
Tuncdogan, Acar, & Stam, 2017) and creative industries in particular
(DCMS, 2017), both of which are characterized by a greater pro-
portion of males. Respondents were predominantly from firms in
advertising (29.5%) and publishing (18.9%). Most were small to
medium in size with just 17% describing their firm as large to ex-
tremely large, and a majority (59.8%) of firms had existed for be-
tween 11 and 30 years. The decision‐making experience of
respondents was 5.92 (SD 1.22) on a 7‐point strongly agree/strongly
disagree Likert‐type scale.
Nonresponse bias was assessed by contacting 30 nonrespondents
by phone. The overwhelming majority indicated that they were “too
busy” or needed to abide by company policies not to respond to sur-
veys. The means for replies to five items taken at random from the
questionnaire as provided by the first quartile and the last quartile of
respondents were compared and provided no statistically significant
differences (Armstrong & Overton, 1977). The reported findings sug-
gest that nonresponse bias is not likely to be a severe concern for this
study.
4 | RESULTS
4.1 | Decision‐making types
Responses to the 13 items capturing decision‐making types were
employed to create decision‐making descriptors (see Table 1). The
first cluster consisting of the items capturing “instinct” and “analytic”
where each used to provide two dimensions while the 11 items that
captured “heuristics” provided the third dimension. At over 17% and
19%, the top two heuristics that receive scores greater than five are
“take‐the‐best” and “tallying,” respectively. These were followed by
the “instinct” and “analytic” dimensions at just over 14% and just
1The details of the cover email sent, and the questionnaire used can be obtained from the
lead author.
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below 14%, respectively. The “default,” “recognition,” “fluency,”
“satisficing,” “experience,” “majority,” “equality,” and “hierarchy”
heuristics ranged from 8% to 2%, while “defer” received no scores in
the 6–7 range.
Our initial analyses involving a correlation among the items
measured revealed several interesting associations. The correlations
matrix appears in Table 2. The “Equality” and “Defer” heuristics show
no correlation with any of the other heuristics, the decision‐making
types, or the decision‐making performance items. Among the heur-
istics investigated, there are strong correlations between “Fluency”
and “Recognition” (r = .60; p < .01) and between “Experience” and
“Hierarchy” (r = .47; p < .01). The analytic decision‐making type is
TABLE 2 Correlation matrix
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Decision‐making strategies
1. Analytic 1
2. Instinct .00 1
Heuristics types
3. Tallying .36** .30** 1
4. Take‐the‐best .26** .10 .29** 1
5. Experience .01 .50** .19* .10 1
6. Majority .31** .33** .23* .27** .34** 1
7. Recognition .15 .39** .18* −.04 .31** 35** 1
8. Default .09 .22* .01 .06 .16 .24* .41** 1
9. Hierarchy .00 .38** .15 .05 .47** .27** .39** .29** 1
10. Satisficing .07 .19* .13 .23* .16 .16 .02 .07 −.10 1
11. Fluency .16 .32** .28** .10 .20* .41** .60** .30** .29** .16 1
12. Equality −.04 .06 −.08 .09 .00 .08 .05 .08 .07 .00 .05 1
13. Defer .11 .09 −.03 .12 .00 −.04 .07 .01 .16 −.07 −.01 .04 1
Perceived decision‐making performance
14. Decision‐making accuracy (1–100) .21* .20* .09 .24** .03 .18* .10 −.02 −.08 .20* .05 .06 −.01 1
15. Decision‐making speed (reversed) .34** .09 .28** .16 .17 .22* −.02 −.14 .18* .11 .01 .02 .21* .02
*p < .05.
**p < .01.
TABLE 1 Measurement items with descriptors
Mean SD Scores > 5 %
Decision‐making strategies (1–7 scales)
Analytic The one that proved best based upon analyzing the data 4.31 2.03 42 13.77
Instinct We followed our instincts 4.27 2.03 43 14.10
85 27.87
Heuristic types
Tallying One with highest number of favorable points 5.09 1.70 58 19.02
Take‐the‐best One we thought would be best 4.43 2.35 52 17.05
Experience One most experienced person in team wanted 3.39 2.04 24 7.87
Majority One most people wanted 3.37 1.86 17 5.57
Recognition One most recognized 3.09 1.97 16 5.25
Default One most like what we normally do 2.79 1.85 14 4.59
Hierarchy One that senior managers wanted 2.73 2.01 16 5.25
Satisficing First one that exceeded our objectives 2.51 1.87 11 3.61
Fluency One we recognized quickest 2.32 1.57 7 2.30
Equality We allocated resources equally 1.57 1.32 5 1.64
Defer We hired a consultant to make the choice 1.12 0.46 0 0.00
Perceived decision‐making performance 220 72.13
Decision‐making accuracy (1–100) How confident are you that you made the right choice? 81.43 15.59
Decision‐making speed (reversed) A lot of time is taken to reach the choice 3.36 1.90
Abbreviation: SD, standard deviation.
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correlated with the heuristics for “Tallying,” “Take‐the‐best,” and
“Majority” while the instinct decision‐making type is strongly corre-
lated with the heuristic for “Experience” (r = .50; p < .01) as well as
with all the others heuristics including “Majority” and “Tallying” but
not “Take‐the‐best.” The analytic decision‐making type is correlated
with both items of decision‐making performance. In contrast, the
instinct decision‐making type is only correlated with the decision‐
making accuracy item of performance.
In addition, we undertook a series of multivariate regression
analyses using decision‐making accuracy and speed as dependent
variables, and decision‐making types as independent variables
were performed. The results are presented in Table 3. The results
suggest that the instinct decision‐making type was the strongest
and most consistent predictor of decision‐making accuracy. Put
differently, the use of instinct was positively related to making
more accurate decisions. The results also show that multiple
decision‐making types impacted decision‐making speed. In parti-
cular, “Analytic,” “Hierarchy,” and “Defer” were associated with
being slower in decision‐making while “Default” was associated
with a faster decision.
4.2 | Decision‐maker profiles
Based on the results related to decision‐making types and prior re-
search, we identified specific managerial decision‐maker profiles.
These profiles focus on identifying how managers make a decision;
that is how an individual manager combines different decision‐
making types. To that end, the data “instinct,” “analytic,” and “heur-
istics” were treated as three dimensions that could be either domi-
nant or not dominant, with a score higher than five treated as
dominant. These combinations enabled the identification of eight
profiles used for making innovation screening decisions (see Table 4).
The results reveal that not all eight alternative decision‐maker
profiles are present in real life. Thus, the “instinct–analytic hybrid”
decision‐maker profile was not in evidence while, “analytic only” and
“instinct only” decision‐maker profiles were only reported by three
and one respondent, respectively. These findings suggest that al-
though conceptually possible, these three innovation decision‐maker
profiles are not commonly present in practice. Excluding these
three profiles, leaves five common decision‐maker profiles, namely:
“low engagement,” “heuristics only,” “instinct–heuristics hybrid,”
“analytic–heuristics hybrid,” and “full engagement.” The results con-
firm that the use of heuristics is a pervasive decision‐making type
among managers. In the case of managers with “low engagement,”
operationalized as having scored 5 or less in each of the heuristics,
instinct, and analytic, the suggestion is that the particular decision is
one where managers are not concerned with achieving decision‐
making speed or accuracy. Over 60% of the primary decision‐maker
profiles relied on heuristics as a dominant type, either singly or
jointly with another type. Table 4 also provides means and standard
deviations for each innovation decision‐maker profile by perceived
decision‐making accuracy and speed.
To assess the impact of the identified innovation decision‐maker
profiles on the two perceived decision‐making performance items of
accuracy and speed, we conducted multivariate generalized linear
model (GLM). The analysis added respondents' subjective assessment
of their business experience as a covariate to control for its effect on
the link between the two sets of variables given the literature
highlighting the importance of different levels of experience among
managers in heuristics decision‐making (e.g., Fredrickson, 1985).
Box's test of equality of covariance matrix and Levene's test of
equality of error variance were not significant, confirming that the
assumption of homogeneity of covariance and variance has been met.
The multivariate tests show a significant main effect when controlling
for the covariate (Wilk's lambda = 0.81; F[8, 220] = 3.02; p < .001) so
the tests of between‐subjects effects were investigated.2 The
univariate analyses for perceived decision‐making accuracy and
speed yielded significant main effects at F[4, 112] = 2.45; p < .05 and
F[4, 112] = 3.67; p < .05, respectively. Further exploration of paired
comparisons of different decision‐maker profiles was then
TABLE 3 Results of the OLS regression analyses predicting








Prior experience .24** (1.18) .07 (0.14)
Analytic .16 (0.76) −.27** (0.09)
Instinct .25* (0.85) .05 (0.10)
Tallying −.07 (0.95) −.16 (0.11)
Take‐the‐best .14 (0.66) .03 (0.08)
Experience −.13 (0.83) −.08 (0.10)
Majority .14 (0.91) −.14 (0.11)
Recognition .15 (0.95) .10 (0.11)
Default −.08 (0.81) .20* (0.10)
Hierarchy −.10 (0.84) −.20† (0.10)
Satisficing .10 (0.77) −.12 (0.09)
Fluency −.13 (1.13) .09 (0.13)
Equality .04 (1.06) −.04 (0.12)
Defer −.04 (3.07) −.17** (0.36)
R2 .24 .29
F 2.37** 3.15***
Note: Values are standardized coefficients. Standard errors are in
parentheses.





2Please note: we also looked at the age of participants as a proxy for years of experience,
and the results were not significantly different. We opted to stick with perceived experience
because it is a more direct measure of the construct we are interested in.
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undertaken. In terms of perceived decision‐making accuracy, the “low
engagement” decision‐maker profile was significantly lower than
“instinct–heuristics” (Mdifference = 10.61; p < .05), “analytic–heuristics”
(Mdifference = 11.26; p < .05) and “full engagement” (Mdifference = 11.94;
p < .05), but not with “heuristics only.” With respect to perceived
decision‐making speed, the analysis revealed that the “low engage-
ment” profile had a significantly lower score than “analytic–heuristic”
(Mdifference = 1.13; p < .05) and “full engagement” (Mdifference = 1.93;
p < .01), but not with “heuristics only” and “instinct–heuristics”
profiles.
5 | DISCUSSION
5.1 | Overview of the findings
How do managers make decisions when they have to choose among
alternative innovation projects? We suggest here that the top tools
employed are the heuristics “take‐the‐best” and “tallying,” followed by
managers' “instinct” and an “analytic” processes approach. The heur-
istics of “default,” “recognition,” “fluency,” “satisficing,” “experience,”
“majority,” “equality,” and “hierarchy” are relatively less used. Managers
seem to differ in terms of their reliance on their instinct, analytic pro-
cesses, and heuristics in making decisions. Specifically, five main
decision‐maker profiles were identified, namely: (a) low engagement, (b)
heuristic only, (c) instinct–heuristic hybrid, (d) analytic–heuristic hybrid,
and (e) full engagement. Except for decisions with low engagement,
heuristics always play a role in decision‐making. These are either used
alone or jointly with other decision‐making types. The evidence suggests
that managers rarely make decisions purely based on “instinct” or
“analytic” processes (see, e.g., Forlani, Mullins, & Walker, 2002).
The decision‐maker profile that managers belong to has important
consequences on their decision‐making performance. Figure 1 illus-
trates these consequences for perceived decision‐making speed and
accuracy. Not surprisingly, when decision‐making involved an “analytic”
process, it was more accurate, but slower than low engagement deci-
sions. Arguably the more critical findings from the study relate to the
comparison of profiles when managers used at least one of the domi-
nant decision‐making types. Perhaps the most interesting finding is that
managers that belong to an “instinct–heuristic hybrid” or a “heuristic
only” profile were able to generate decisions that were perceived as
accurate as managers who used data analysis in their decision‐making.
However, they were able to do so at a significantly faster rate.
We find that one reason why the employment of analysis in
decision‐making did not bring accuracy benefits might be related to
the nature of innovation screening decisions. Such decisions are
made very early in the NPD process, and at that point, the in-
formation upon which screening decisions are based may often be
unreliable (Kester, Griffin, Hultink, & Lauche, 2011). It is notoriously
difficult to have reliable information on many important factors that
would be needed for making an effective screening decision. The
information required includes data on customer reactions, compe-
titor moves, and potential problems that might arise throughout the
innovation process. Moreover, unforeseeable uncertainties or “un-
known unknowns” (Loch et al., 2008) are likely to be extensive at the
F IGURE 1 Decision‐maker profile and decision‐making performance3 [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
3The perceived decision‐making speed scale is rescaled to 0‐100 to facilitate comparison
with decision‐making accuracy.
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front‐end of innovation. This highly uncertain environment together
with unreliable information may favor the effectiveness of “instinct”
while diminishing that of an “analytic” process approach. Besides,
the creative industry context of this study that is known to be
characterized by high uncertainty about how customers react to
innovations (Caves, 2000) may have further contributed to “instinct”
proving more effective in making innovation screening decisions.
6 | CONCLUSION
By surveying senior managers from creative industries, we explored
what decision‐making types managers use when choosing new pro-
ducts to invest in and how these strategies affect decision‐making
performance. Interestingly, the results show that when managers
trust their instincts solely or use these concurrently with simple
heuristics, they achieve the best decision‐making performance in
terms of perceived accuracy and speed. Our findings set the stage for
further theoretical progress toward a better understanding of the
innovation decision‐making processes.
6.1 | Implications
Our study has important implications for the marketing and decision‐
making literatures. First, it sheds light on how managers make deci-
sions when selecting between alternative innovation projects to in-
vest in. Research has shown that managers not only use analytic
processes, but can also make new product portfolio management
decision based upon their instincts and power dynamics (Kester
et al., 2011; Kester, Hultink, & Lauche, 2009). However, the role of
heuristics has remained largely unexplored. Heuristics have a central
role in managerial decision‐making and are widely used for important
decisions (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011; Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier,
2011; Kolsarici et al., 2020; West, Christodoulides, & Bonhomme,
2018). This study provides some of the first empirical evidence to
explain how managers use heuristics when choosing which innova-
tion projects to invest in. It not only focuses on heuristics but also
addresses the vital role of “instinctive” and “analytic” processes in
decision‐making. It, therefore, bridges and extends prior research on
decision‐making during innovation. The research has allowed the
identification of specific decision‐making types that are concurrently
employed to assist decision‐making as well as typical decision‐maker
profiles that managers belong to.
Our study contributes to the understanding of the consequences
of decision‐making types by extending prior research, which showed
how the use of instinctive and analytic processes and the reliance on
data can influence decision‐making performance (Hammedi
et al., 2011; Kester et al., 2011). This study takes these findings
further by showing how the use of heuristics and its interaction with
instinctive and analytic processes of decision‐making affect perceived
accuracy and speed of those decisions. The findings provide an im-
portant step toward a more comprehensive understanding of
decision‐making at the front‐end of innovation. Given the importance
of such decisions for organizational competitiveness and success
(Chao & Kavadias, 2008), this understanding is of great value both to
marketing theory and practice.
We also provide implications for the broader psychology and
management literature on decision‐making. The current literature of-
ten assumes that heuristics and instinct increase perceived decision‐
making speed, but that they do so at the expense of accuracy (Dane &
Pratt, 2007; Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). The findings from this
study show that in terms of the perceived accuracy‐speed trade‐off,
this unfolds differently in the context of innovation screening deci-
sions. Specifically, when heuristics and instinct–heuristic combinations
are used concurrently in decision‐making, perceived speed is increased
without compromising perceived accuracy. Also, the extant literature
has often focused on decision‐making types in isolation (e.g., Wübben
& Wangenheim, 2008) and does not consider interactions between
different strategies. The findings in this study suggest that unique
interactions between these strategies influence outcomes.
6.2 | Managerial implications
The core managerial implication of this study is that when managers
are selecting what innovation project to invest in, they can rely on
simple heuristics, such as selecting the project with the highest num-
ber of favorable points. By relying on heuristics, we find that managers
can make decisions that are as accurate as when they rely on data
analytical processes to inform their decisions. Moreover, they can do
so much more quickly. Manager can trust their gut feelings as long as
they combine it with simple heuristics. It is, however, worth noting that
some studies suggest that the effectiveness of intuition compared to
analysis is contingent on domain knowledge. Therefore, managers with
limited expertise might be better off, relying only on heuristics rather
than combining them with intuition (Dane & Pratt, 2007; Dane,
Rockmann, & Pratt, 2012). Overall, our findings suggest that when
both perceived accuracy and speed of decisions are important, reliance
on instincts or heuristics or a combination of both can provide an
optimal decision‐making approach. Such situations are often en-
countered in the case of innovation screening decisions. Reliance on
instincts or heuristics makes for quicker and just as accurate outcomes
as involving analytical processes.
6.3 | Limitations and future research
The implications discussed above must be qualified in light of the
limitations of this study. One limitation relates to the response rate
and the sample size achieved. These are both comparable to other
studies surveying managers in creative industries (e.g., Chaston &
Sadler‐Smith, 2012) and are therefore fairly representative of players
in the creative industries (advertising, digital, publishing, and
software). However, the generalization of the findings to different
industries must necessarily be made with caution. The sample of
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managers from creative industries was chosen because these in-
dustries are characterized by high levels of uncertainty about cus-
tomer reactions and an infinite variety of potential new products
(Caves, 2000). Other industries that do not share these properties
might provide different results. The steps taken to control for
common‐method bias and testing for its presence using Harman's
factor analysis test, suggest that this bias is not likely to be a serious
concern. However, the possible presence of such a bias cannot be
ruled out entirely, and future researchers might consider collecting
data utilizing multiple sources for independent and dependent vari-
ables. As well, the respondents who commented and advised on the
questionnaire were asked to think about a recent innovation project,
but such projects can differ markedly and may represent radical,
incremental, or disruptive innovations. Participants might have,
therefore, thought about different types of projects and this may
have impacted our results. Also, the results of the regression linking
heuristics to performance outcomes are necessarily indicative. They
need to be treated with caution because of the possible existence of
multicollinearity among the independent variables. Finally, the cross‐
sectional design of the study limits the degree of certainty in de-
termining causality. Therefore, future research might consider em-
ploying longitudinal or experimental designs to ensure the causal
direction of findings.
In terms of future work, a natural extension of this study would be
to address other important decisions made in the NPD process. The
decisions we focus on in this study concerns those in the front‐end of
innovation, which is characterized by extremely high uncertainty (e.g.,
Hammedi et al., 2011; Hauser et al., 2006). As an original idea progresses
through the different stages in the NPD process (e.g., concept testing,
business analysis, prototyping, beta testing, etc.), uncertainty is reduced
thanks to information and feedback acquired throughout. We encourage
researchers to explore whether these differences matter in terms of
reliance to and usefulness of different decision‐making types. It is, for
example, possible that managers rely less on their instincts once they
have more data and feedback from consumers. Likewise, an analysis
might only be useful when there is sufficient data. It would be fascinating
to investigate whether similar decision‐making types are used for other
circumstances, situations, and industries. Besides, future research might
also address organizational factors that might influence the choice of
decision‐making types and emergence of decision‐maker profiles.
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